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Abstract
We consider full implementation in abstract complete-information environments
when agents have an arbitrarily small preference for honesty. We offer a condition
called separable punishment and show that when it holds and there are at least two
agents, any social choice function can be implemented by a simple mechanism in
two rounds of iterated deletion of strictly dominated strategies. We also extend our
result to settings of incomplete information so long as there is non-exclusive infor-
mation.
1 Introduction
What social objectives can be achieved in decentralized economies? In his celebrated
work, Maskin (1999, circulated in 1977), formally introduced the notion of implementing
social choice functions (hereafter, SCFs) through a suitably-constructed mechanism or
game form when agents know some “state of the world” that a social planner does not.1
Maskin (1999) focussed on outcomes that obtain in Nash equilibria and found that only
SCFs that satisfy a fairly demanding property, (Maskin-)monotonicity, are implementable.
∗Holden: University of New South Wales, School of Economics, Australian School of Busi-
ness and NBER; email: richard.holden@unsw.edu.au. Kartik: Columbia University; email:
nkartik@columbia.edu. Tercieux: Paris School of Economics; email: tercieux@pse.ens.fr.
1“Implementation” without qualification in this paper always refers to full-implementation, which
means that every outcome should coincide with the social objective; this contrasts with partial-
implementation where only some outcome need be desirable.
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Moreover, sufficiency of this property — along with some other mild conditions — has
only been established in general environments using so-called “integer games” or “tail-
chasing mechanisms”, which are unappealing for well-known reasons (see, for example,
Jackson, 1992).
For both the above reasons, a sizable literature has examined implementation in
other solution concepts, often refinements of Nash equilibria. Perhaps most promi-
nently, the scope for implementation expands substantially when one considers either
subgame-perfect Nash equilibria (Abreu and Sen, 1990; Moore and Repullo, 1988) or
undominated Nash equilibria (Palfrey and Srivastava, 1991; Jackson et al., 1994); fur-
thermore, the mechanisms used in some of these papers are insulated from the critiques
levied against the mechanisms used for Nash implementation.
However, these implementations of non-monotonic SCFs are problematic because
they are not robust to even slight departures from underlying common knowledge as-
sumptions (Chung and Ely, 2003; Aghion et al., 2012). An alternative approach that also
yields permissive results is that of virtual or approximate implementation (Matsushima,
1988; Abreu and Sen, 1991; Abreu and Matsushima, 1992b). As is well-known, however,
a weakness of this approach is that mechanisms must randomize over outcomes and
the resulting outcome may be very inefficient, unfair, or “far” from the desired out-
come, even if this only occurs with small ex-ante probability.2 Furthermore, many of
these results become much less permissive when the implementation problem concerns
only two players, a case that is important due to its relevance for bilateral contracting.
More recently, a burgeoning literature studies the scope for implementation when
players have preferences for honesty. Loosely, a (small) preference for honesty means
that a player has an intrinsic preference for “truthful” messages/reports when his mes-
sage does not change the outcome of the mechanism.3 Intuitively, what now determines
2Moreover, Matsushima (1988) and Abreu and Sen (1991) also use integer games. Abreu and Mat-
sushima (1992b) achieve implementation in iterative deletion of (strictly) dominated strategies with fi-
nite mechanisms (in a very broad class of finite environments), but rely quite critically on the linearity
assumption of expected utility. Furthermore, they use potentially-long chains of iterative dominance
reasoning, which has been criticized by, for example, Glazer and Rosenthal (1992); see Abreu and Mat-
sushima (1992a) for a response and Sefton and Yavas (1996) for experimental evidence bearing on the
debate. Abreu and Matsushima (1994) use similar ideas as Abreu and Matsushima (1992b) to obtain exact
implementation in iterative deletion of weakly-dominated strategies under certain conditions.
3In this paper, we focus on settings where preferences for honesty are small in the sense that they
only play a role when players are indifferent (or nearly indifferent) over outcomes. Of course, in some
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implementability is preferences over the joint space of messages and outcomes. Kartik
and Tercieux (2012) observe that preferences for honesty render any SCF monotonic on
this extended space. This suggests that even Nash implementation may be quite permis-
sive when players have preferences for honesty. However, existing results suffer from
at least one of the weaknesses mentioned above. For example, Dutta and Sen (2011),
Lombardi and Yoshihara (2011), and Kartik and Tercieux (2012) use integer games, Mat-
sushima (2008a) uses mechanisms that randomize over outcomes and only studies set-
tings with three or more players, while Matsushima (2008c) also uses randomization
and further assumes stronger conditions on the nature of preferences for honesty.4
In this paper, we also study implementation when players have a preference for hon-
esty. Our contribution is to derive a strong positive result for a general class of environ-
ments of economic interest. Specifically, we show that so long as there are two or more
players and the environment satisfies a condition called separable punishment, any SCF is
implementable in two rounds of iterative deletion of (strictly) dominated strategies by a well-
behaved mechanism. Roughly speaking, the separable-punishment condition requires
that one can find a player with a preference for honesty, say j, and another player, say i,
such that for any outcome in the range of the SCF, there is an alternative outcome under
which, in any state, j is indifferent between the two outcomes while i strictly prefers
the socially-desired outcome to the alternative. In this sense, it is possible to suitably
“punish” one player without punishing the other.
While we defer until later a detailed discussion of the result, a few brief comments
are worth noting up front. First, what makes the separable-punishments condition re-
strictive yet powerful is that the alternative allocation referred to above must be state-
independent. We give examples of economic problems in which this condition is natu-
rally satisfied; in particular, it holds both in a standard exchange economy and also in
applications, it may also be reasonable that players have large preferences for honesty.
4Both Matsushima (2008a) and Matsushima (2008c) achieve implementation in iterated deletion of
dominated strategies following the approach of Abreu and Matsushima (1992b, 1994). A virtue of these
papers is that the planner only needs to be able to impose small fines on players. Note that Matsushima
(2008a) studies settings with complete information, as does most of the literature cited earlier, whereas
Matsushima (2008c) tackles settings with incomplete information relying on the expected utility hypothe-
sis. While we concentrate on complete-information environments in this paper, Section 4 shows how our
ideas can be extended to a class of incomplete information environments under very weak assumptions
on how players evaluate lotteries (in particular, without assuming expected utility).
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any problem when the mechanism has the ability to augment large-enough monetary
punishments on players. The latter is a setting that has received quite some interest, for
example in the incomplete contracts literature (see Section 5). Second, implementation
in two rounds of iterative deletion of dominated strategies is an appealing solution con-
cept. Since it is weaker than rationalizability, it is a robust solution concept (unlike re-
finements of Nash, as noted earlier); moreover, the fact that only two rounds of deletion
are required also means that players only need only mutual knowledge — rather than
common knowledge — that dominated strategies will not be played (cf. Matsushima,
2008b). Third, the mechanism is extremely simple, and is essentially a direct mechanism.
Moreover, if, for example, all players have a preference for honesty and large monetary
punishments are available, implementation is “detail free” in the sense of not depend-
ing on fine details of the environment. Finally, we emphasize that the result applies to
settings with only two players; not only is this inherently important, but inter alia also
disproves a conjecture by Dutta and Sen (2011) that we discuss in Section 3.
The remainder of the paper is organized as follows. Section 2 presents a simple exam-
ple to highlight the main idea. The general setting and result are provided in Section 3.
Section 4 develops an extension to settings of incomplete information using the concept
of non-exclusive information (Postlewaite and Schmeidler, 1986), while making mini-
mal assumptions on how players evaluate lotteries. Finally, Section 5 concludes with
some comments on robustness and implications for a debate in the incomplete contracts
literature.
2 An Example
Consider a setting with two players, 1 and 2, and two states, θ′ and θ′′. The socially
desired outcomes at state θ′ and θ′′ are respectively denoted by f(θ′) and f(θ′′). The
mechanism designer can augment outcomes with transfers (that he is only willing to use
off the equilibrium path). Agents’ preferences are quasi-linear and state independent:
i’s utility at state θ ∈ {θ′, θ′′} given outcome a and transfer ti is represented by vi(a)− ti.
Because preferences are state-independent and the goal is full implementation, f is not
implementable in virtually any solution concept unless f(θ′) = f(θ′′).
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We will study a direct mechanism where each player announces a value of the state.
The outcome selected by the mechanism only depends on player 1’s announcement: if
player 1 claims the state is θ then the outcome selected is f(θ). In this sense, player 1 is
a dictator over outcomes. In terms of transfers, if players disagree on their announce-
ments, then only player 1 is fined an amount t1; if players agree, there is no transfer to
either player.
Now we introduce the notion that player 2 has a preference for honesty by supposing
that his payoff increases by ε > 0 when making an “honest” announcement. Formally,
if the true state is θ ∈ {θ′, θ′′}, the payoff matrix in the game induced by the mechanism
is as follows, where we denote the possible announcements for each player by θ and ¬θ:
(1,2) θ ¬θ
θ v1(f(θ)), v2(f(θ)) + ε v1(f(θ))− t1, v2(f(θ))
¬θ v1(f(¬θ))− t1, v2(f(¬θ)) + ε v1(f(¬θ)), v2(f(¬θ))
Table 1 – Payoffs when the true state is θ
In this game, player 2 has a strictly dominant strategy to announce the truth, θ. Fur-
thermore, provided the fine t1 is large enough, it is then iteratively strictly dominant for
player 1 to also announce θ. Consequently, in either state, both players telling the truth
is the unique profile of strategies surviving two rounds of iterative deletion of strictly
dominated strategies.
Clearly, the assumption of only two states is not important for the argument. Notice
also that we only needed to assume that one player (viz., player 2) has the preference for
honesty, but the mechanism exploits the identity of this player. If, however, both players
have a preference for honesty — which we view as reasonable — then the mechanism
is in fact “detail free” in the sense that the planner can choose either player to act as
“dictator” and does not need to know much about players’ preferences: all that he needs
to do is impose a sufficiently large fine on the dictator when announcements do not
coincide. Of course, there is a minimal requirement that the planner must know what
amount of fine will be large enough.
It is noteworthy that not only is the mechanism used here a direct mechanism, but
also that it works through (iterative) strict dominance. The latter is important because
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researchers often focus only on pure-strategy Nash implementation, and one may be jus-
tifiably concerned that even if a simple mechanism works for this solution concept, it
would need complicated augmentation to deal with mixed strategies. To illustrate, con-
sider a similar setting to the one discussed so far but assume there are now three players
who all have a preference for honesty as described above and there are (at least) three
states. Each player is asked to send a direct message about the state. If two or more of
them reportthe same state, say θ, then the outcome f(θ) is chosen and there are no trans-
fers; otherwise an arbitrary outcome is chosen and each of the three players is fined a
sufficiently large amount. It is not hard to verify that because of preferences for honesty,
the unique pure-strategy Nash equilibrium in any state is for all three players to tell
the truth; consequently, this mechanism implements any social choice function in pure-
strategy Nash equilibria. However, this does not rule out undesirable Nash equilibria
in mixed strategies, and indeed, this can be a problem.5 Our mechanism obviates this
concern, and moreover, only requires two players.
To summarize the message of this section: by constructing a mechanism wherein one
player is indifferent between all strategies in terms of her material payoff, a small pref-
erence for honesty can be exploited to ensure that it is a dominant strategy for her to
tell the truth. The mechanism then ensures that the unique best response for the other
player is to also tell the truth. Below, we will identify a property called separable punish-
ment that permits such a construction more generally under complete information, and
5To see this, consider the following depiction of the mechanism, where rows represent player 1’s mes-
sage, columns represent player 2’s message, each matrix corresponds to player 3’s message, and b (for
“bad”) represents the arbitrary outcome augmented with very large fines to each player:that
θ1 θ2 θ3
θ1 f(θ1) f(θ1) f(θ1)
θ2 f(θ1) f(θ2) b
θ3 f(θ1) b f(θ3)
θ1 θ2 θ3
θ1 f(θ1) f(θ2) b
θ2 f(θ2) f(θ2) f(θ2)
θ3 b f(θ2) f(θ3)
θ1 θ2 θ3
θ1 f(θ1) b f(θ3)
θ2 b f(θ2) f(θ3)
θ3 f(θ3) f(θ3) f(θ3)
θ1 θ2 θ3
Assume the true state is θ1 and in this state all players are indifferent between f(θ2) and f(θ3). Then
there is a mixed-Nash equilibrium in which player 3 announces θ2 and players 1 and 2 each mix, say
uniformly, between announcing θ2 and θ3. Notice that while there would be multiple pure-strategy Nash
equilibria without a preference for honesty, the unique pure-strategy Nash equilibrium when all players
have a preference for honesty is for them to announce θ1.
This example also provides some insight into the similar mechanism studied by Ortner (2012). As
he addresses implementation in some refinements of pure-strategy Nash equilibria with preferences for
honesty, he does not require existence of the “bad outcome”,b, used in this example.
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then extend the result to some settings of incomplete information.
3 The Main Result
There is a set of states Θ, a set of outcomes or allocations A, and a finite set of players
I = {1, . . . , n} with n ≥ 2. A social choice function (SCF) is a mapping f : Θ → A.
Given any function α whose domain is Θ, let α(Θ) :=
⋃
θ∈Θ α(θ). The primitives specify
(ordinal) preferences over A in each state θ for each player j, captured by a linear order
Aj,θ. Given a space of message profiles, M = M1 × · · · ×Mn, players have preferences
defined over the joint space of allocations and message profiles: in each state θ, a player
j has preferences over A ×M denoted by j,θ. In the standard framework, (a,m) j,θ
(a′,m′) if and only if a Aj,θ a′. A mechanism is a pair (M, g) where g : M → A. To
simplify the exposition we will focus below on pure strategies only; all the concepts and
results can be extended to cover mixed strategies with very weak assumptions on how
players evaluate lotteries, as should be clear from the arguments we make.
We now formalize our general notion of a preference for honesty.
Definition 1. Given a space of message profiles, M , j has a preference for honesty on M if
there is an injective function m∗j : Θ→Mj such that for any g : M → A and θ ∈ Θ:
If
∀m−j,mj, m˜j : g(m−j,mj) ∼Aj,θ g(m−j, m˜j) (1)
then
∀m−j and ∀mj 6= m∗j(θ) : (g(m−j,m∗j(θ)),m−j,m∗j(θ)) j,θ (g(m−j,mj),m−j,mj). (2)
The key idea here is that because of the antecedent (1), the condition only has bite
on preferences over the subset of A×M among which j is “materially indifferent” over
the allocations; in this sense, it captures small or even lexicographic considerations. The
message m∗j(θ) is what j considers “truthful” in state θ. A leading example is when
Mj = Θ and j’s preferences are as follows: (i) if a Aj,θ a′, mj = θ, and m′j 6= θ, then
(a,m) j,θ (a′,m′); (ii) otherwise, (a,m) j,θ (a′,m′) if and only if a Aj,θ a′. In this case,
m∗j(θ) = θ and our definition reduces to that of Dutta and Sen (2011) and is very similar
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to Kartik and Tercieux (2012, Example 2).
It is worth highlighting that a player’s preference for honesty is defined with respect
to a particular space of message profiles; in particular, Definition 1 does not require
player j’s message space to coincide with the set of states (although its cardinality must
be at least as large).6 To see why this may be substantively relevant, suppose each state
is a profile of preferences over allocations. Then, if player j were asked to report the
state (i.e. Mj = Θ) he may not have a strict preference for truth-telling because he is
reporting other players’ allocation-preferences too; but if he is asked to only report his
own allocation-preferences (i.e. that component of the state), then his preference for
truth-telling may have bite. So long as player j’s allocation-preferences are distinct in
every state, this setting would satisfy Definition 1.
We next introduce the domain restriction that will play a central role in our main
result.
Definition 2. There is separable punishment if there is a function x : Θ→ A and players i
and j 6= i such that for all θ ∈ Θ and θ′ ∈ Θ: x(θ′) ∼Aθ,j f(θ′) and x(θ′) ≺Aθ,i f(θ).
In words, separable punishment says requires for each state θ′, there be an alterna-
tive to the socially desired outcome, x(θ′) 6= f(θ′), such that in any state θ, player j is
indifferent between x(θ′) and f(θ′) while player i finds x(θ′) strictly worse than f(θ′).
Separable punishment differs from various “bad/worst outcome” conditions in the lit-
erature (e.g. Moore and Repullo, 1990; Jackson et al., 1994) in three ways: first, it allows
for state-dependent alternative allocations; second, it requires that each state’s alterna-
tive allocation keep player j indifferent rather than making him worse off, and further-
more satisfy this indifference no matter the true state; and third, it does not require that
a state’s alternative allocation must be “bad” for player i relative to all allocations in the
range of the SCF, but rather only with respect to the state’s socially desired alternative.
Generally, separable punishment is more likely to hold when there are transferable
private goods, and indeed, there are natural and well-studied economic environments
that satisfy separable punishment. We provide two examples. Consider first an econ-
omy with transfers and quasi-linear preferences. Here the outcome space A = B × Rn
6Furthermore, the definition also allows j’s preferences to depend on the messages sent by other play-
ers beyond how these affect allocations.
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consists of pairs (b, t) where b is some fundamental allocation and t = (ti)i∈I is a vec-
tor of transfers. For each player i and state θ, preferences Ai,θ over outcomes (b, t) are
represented by vi(b, θ) − ti. Further assume that for some player i, the function vi(·, ·) is
bounded uniformly over b and θ, i.e., there is a constant C ∈ R+ satisfying |vi(b, θ)| ≤ C
for all b and θ. Given the SCF f : Θ → B × Rn, for any θ let fb(θ) be first component
of f(θ) and fti(θ) be the transfer specified for player i. One can now easily check that
the requirement of separable punishment is satisfied with the function x(·) defined by
x(θ) = (fb(θ), t
′) where t′i is chosen sufficiently large while t′j = ftj(θ) for all j 6= i. This
setting subsumes prominent settings in the literature such as Moore and Repullo (1988,
Section 5).
Second, consider an exchange economy with ` ≥ 2 commodities. There is an aggre-
gate endowment vector ω` ∈ R`++. An outcome a is an allocation (a1, ..., an) ∈ R`n such
that ai ≥ 0 and
∑
i∈I ai ≤ ω`.7 For each player i and state θ, preferences Ai,θ over out-
comes are assumed to be strictly increasing in i’s component, i.e., ai > a′i =⇒ a Ai,θ a′.
Assume that at each state the social choice function f allocates each player a strictly
positive amount of some commodity. It is now straightforward to verify that separable
punishment is satisfied with the function x(·) defined by x(θ) = a′ such that a′i = 0 while
a′j = fj(θ) for all j 6= i, where fj(θ) denotes player j’s component of the allocation f(θ).
We are now in a position to state the main result.
Theorem 1. Assume separable punishment and fix i and j from that definition. Suppose further
there is a message space (Mi,Mj) such that (i) there is some injective function hi : Θ→Mi, and
(ii) player j has a preference for honesty on (Mi,Mj). Then the SCF f can be implemented in
two rounds of iterated deletion of strictly dominated strategies.
Proof. Fix i, j and Mi,Mj from the theorem’s hypotheses. Pick an arbitrary θ∗ ∈ Θ and
define the mechanism ((Mi,Mj), g) where
g(mi,mj) =

f(h−1i (mi)) if mi ∈ hi(Θ) and mj = m∗j(h−1i (mi))
x(h−1i (mi)) if mi ∈ hi(Θ) and mj 6= m∗j(h−1i (mi))
x(θ∗) otherwise.
7Each ai is a vector with l components;≥ and> on Rl are the standard component-wise partial orders.
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Consider any state θ. For any given mi, j is indifferent over all the outcomes he can
induce, so condition (1) is satisfied. Hence, j’s preference for honesty implies (2) and it
is strictly dominant for j to send message m∗j(θ).
Now fix mj = m∗j(θ). It follows from the definition of g(·) that if player i reports
mi = hi(θ), then because m∗j(h
−1
i (mi)) = m
∗
j(θ) (using the injective property of hi(·)), he
induces f(h−1i (mi)) = f(θ). The definition of g(·) combined with the injective property
of both m∗j(·) and hi(·) further implies that if player i sends any mi 6= hi(θ), he will
induce x(θ′) for some θ′. The separable punishment condition implies that x(θ′) for any
θ′ is strictly worse for i than f(θ) in state θ. It follows that the unique best response for
player i is to send message hi(θ).
Therefore, the unique strategy profile surviving two rounds of iterative deletion of
strictly dominated strategies is mj = m∗j(θ) and mi = hi(θ), which yields the outcome
f(θ), as desired.
The essence of the logic behind Theorem 1 is similar to that presented in the example
of Section 2. Indeed, if we were to assume that each Mi is the set of states of the world,
we could just let hi(·) in the proof of Theorem 1 be the identity mapping. In addition, if
we (naturally) assume that the function m∗j(·) is the identity mapping, the mechanism in
the proof simplifies to the following: denoting player i’s announcement of the state by
θi, choose outcome f(θi) if player j announces the same state; otherwise choose x(θi).
By the separable punishment condition, player j is indifferent between all his messages.
So it is uniquely optimal for player j to tell the truth; in turn, separable punishment
further implies that the unique best response for player i is to also tell the truth. Plainly,
this mechanism is an extremely simple direct mechanism: there is only one round of
messages and obviously no use of integer games or related ideas.
Dutta and Sen (2011) provide a separability condition under which they establish
that any social choice function can be implemented by a mechanism that does not use
integer games so long as there are three or more players. Their condition is logically
incomparable with our separable punishment condition. However, separability condi-
tions in the literature generally incorporate settings such as public-good environments
with transfers and quasi-linear preferences,8 but Dutta and Sen’s notion excludes this
8See, for example, Jackson et al. (1994). Our condition is also logically incomparable with that of
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standard environment (as they note) while ours does not. This is one reason our result
applies to a class of economic problems that Theorem 4 in Dutta and Sen (2011) does not.
Furthermore, our result applies when there are only two players, which is important for
some applications. In fact, Dutta and Sen (2011, page 166) discuss whether a strengthen-
ing of their separability condition would be sufficient for implementation with a small
preference for honesty when there are only two players. They conjecture that the answer
to this question must be negative. Our Theorem 1 disproves their conjecture because
their suggested strengthening is stronger than our separable punishment condition.9
The message of Theorem 1 is related to a result in Ben-Porath and Lipman (2011).
They show that in a complete-information setting where any pair of states can be distin-
guished via hard evidence by some player, a planner who can use large off-path fines
can implement any SCF in subgame-perfect equilibria of a perfect-information mecha-
nism. They note that their conclusion also holds if players have a small cost of forging
evidence. Settings with preferences for honesty are a special case of settings with costly
evidence fabrication (cf. Kartik and Tercieux, 2012). Due to the additional structure, The-
orem 1 derives a much simpler mechanism and stronger conclusion than Theorem 1 of
Ben-Porath and Lipman.
4 Incomplete Information
In this section, we depart from the complete-information assumption. The goal is to
identify relatively simple conditions under which the logic underlying Theorem 1 can
be extended to settings of incomplete information.
Jackson et al. (1994), but both conditions hold in the pure exchange economy and transferable-utility
settings discussed following Definition 2.
9Dutta and Sen (2011) call an environment separable if there exists an alternative w ∈ A with the
following property: for all a ∈ A and J ⊆ N , there exists aJ ∈ A such that for any θ, aJ ∼Aθ,j w for all
j ∈ J and aJ ∼Aθ,i a for all i /∈ J . The strengthening they propose for the two-player case consists in
assuming that w is the “worst” outcome relative to outcomes in the range of the SCF, i.e., w ≺Aθ,i f(θ) for
each player i and state θ. It is straightforward that this would imply our separability condition with the
function x(·) defined as x(θ) = f(θ){i} for all θ.
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4.1 Setting and Definitions
In a setting of incomplete information, each player i has a set of types Ti, with a generic
element denoted by ti. For technical convenience, each Ti is assumed to be a finite set.
The set of profiles of types is denoted T := T1×· · ·Tn and P is the prior probability over
T . We let T ∗ ⊆ T be the set of types with positive prior probability. A social choice func-
tion is now f : T ∗ → A, where A is the space of allocations. Without loss, we assume
that P (ti) :=
∑
t−i∈T−i P (ti, t−i) > 0 for each i and ti. Let the conditional probability dis-
tribution given any ti be P (t−i | ti) := P (ti,t−i)P (ti) . To avoid some inessential complications
involving conditioning on zero-probability events, we will further assume that for each
j and each t−j , P (t−j) :=
∑
tj∈Tj P (tj, t−j) > 0. An incomplete information environment is
a tuple of players, spaces of allocations and type profiles, and a prior, i.e. 〈I, A, T, P 〉.
Throughout what follows, we fix such an environment.
A key ingredient that helps extend our earlier argument to the current setting is that
no player has exclusive information, a notion that is familiar in the Bayesian implemen-
tation literature (e.g. Postlewaite and Schmeidler, 1986). Informally, there is non-exclusive
information (NEI) if, whenever the designer learns the profile of types of players other
than j, he can infer what the true type of player j is. Formally:
Definition 3. The incomplete-information environment satisfies NEI if for each j and
t−j there is some tj such that P (tj | t−j) = 1.
It is important to note that the complete-information environment considered in the
previous section can be viewed as an incomplete-information environment satisfying
NEI: set Ti = Θ for all i and P (t1, . . . , tn) > 0 if and only if (t1, . . . , tn) = (θ, . . . , θ) for
some θ ∈ Θ. Note also that when there are only two players, NEI implies complete
information.
Given a profile of types t, each agent j has an ex-post preference order At,j over al-
locations, with ∼At,j denoting the corresponding ranking of indifference. Given a space
of message profiles, M = M1 × · · · ×Mn, and a profile of types, t, a player j also has
ex-post preferences over A ×M−j denoted by t,j . To simplify the exposition, we will
focus hereafter on direct mechanisms, i.e. assume the message space for each player i is
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Mi = Ti.10 We can now define preferences for honesty under incomplete information:
Definition 4. Agent j has a preference for honesty on T if for any g : T → A and tj ∈ Tj :
If for all t−j for which P (t−j | tj) > 0, it holds that
∀t′−j, t′j : g(t′−j, tj) ∼A(tj ,t−j),j g(t′−j, t′j), (3)
then for all t−j for which P (t−j | tj) > 0, it also holds that
∀t′−j and ∀t′j 6= tj : (g(t′−j, tj), t′−j, tj) (tj ,t−j),j (g(t′−j, t′j), t′−j, t′j). (4)
Intuitively, the above definition says that if player j with a given type tj is indiffer-
ent over all allocations he can induce when taking as given an arbitrary report of his
opponents, then he strictly prefers to tell the truth. Note that the antecedent is demand-
ing, and hence the requirement overall is weak. It is not hard to verify that, for direct
message spaces, the above definition reduces to Definition 1 when there is complete
information.
Next, we state the domain restriction that is the analog of Definition 2 for incomplete-
information environments:
Definition 5. Fix an incomplete information environment satisfying NEI and some SCF
f : T ∗ → A. There is Bayesian separable punishment if there is a function x : T\T ∗ → A
and a player i such that for all j 6= i and for all t ∈ T ∗:
1. x(t′j, t′−j) ∼At,j f(t∗j(t′−j), t′−j) for all t′−j and t′j satisfying (t′j, t′−j) /∈ T ∗, where t∗j(t′−j)
is the unique type such that (t∗j(t′−j), t′−j) ∈ T ∗;
2. x(t′i, t−i) ≺At,i f(ti, t−i) for all t′i satisfying (t′i, t−i) /∈ T ∗.
The intuition behind this condition is related to that underlying separable punish-
ment in the complete-information environment: one should be able to find allocations
for certain profiles of types that keep some players indifferent relative to certain socially-
desired allocations, while being worse for other players than some socially-desired allo-
cations. To see that Definition 5 strictly generalizes Definition 2, suppose Ti = Θ for each
10One can extend the subsequent development to indirect mechanisms in a manner similar to Section 3.
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i and the prior P (t) > 0 if and only if t = (θ, ..., θ). Assume the complete-information
separable punishment per Definition 2, yielding a function x(θ). Now define the func-
tion xˆ : T\T ∗ → A as follows: for any t ∈ T\T ∗, xˆ(t) := x(ti). It is readily verified that
the function xˆ(·) satisfies the requirement of Definition 5.
It is worth highlighting, however, that in a setting with genuine incomplete infor-
mation, Bayesian separable punishment is more demanding in spirit that its complete-
information counterpart because Definition 5 uses a universal quantifier over players
j 6= i while Definition 2 only has an existential quantifier. The reason is straightforward:
under incomplete information, we will need to elicit the type of each of n − 1 players
(with the last player taken care of by NEI), whereas in the complete information setting,
it suffices to elicit the type of just one player.
Nevertheless, there are interesting economic environments with incomplete infor-
mation that satisfy Bayesian separable punishment. For instance, assume player 1 is a
seller and the other n − 1 other players are buyers. Assume further that the seller has
no exclusive information. The outcome space is A1 ×
∏
j 6=1
Aj where for j 6= 1, Aj = R2+
specifies the price paid to the seller and the quantity of goods obtained by each buyer
while A1 = R+ specifies a fine paid by the seller. Each buyer j cares only about the price
he pays and the quantity of goods he gets, i.e., he only cares about the jth component
of the outcome space; the seller cares, of course, about the price paid by each buyer and
the fine he must pay (he may also care about the quantities of goods he need to pro-
vide, if, for example, there is a cost of production). Let f be any social choice function
such that for any t ∈ T ∗, f(t) involves no fine paid by the seller. Assume that a suffi-
ciently severe fine on the seller is worse for him than any outcome in the range of the
social choice function f . Then, construct the function x as follows.11 For all j 6= 1 and
(t′j, t
′
−j) /∈ T ∗ : xj(t′j, t′−j) = fj(t′′j , t′−j) where t′′j is the unique type of player j satisfying
(t′′j , t
′
−j) ∈ T ∗. In addition, for all (t′i, t′−i) /∈ T ∗, x1(t′i, t′−i) is a large enough fine such that
it is worse for player 1 than f1(t′′i , t′−i) where t′′i is the unique type of player i satisfy-
ing (t′′i , t′−i) ∈ T ∗. It is straightforward that x(·) so-defined satisfies the requirement of
Definition 5.
11In what follows, we use standard notation and write xi(·) as well as fi(·) for the projections of x(·)
and f(·) on Ai.
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4.2 The Result
To state our result for incomplete information, we must take some stand on how play-
ers evaluate lotteries (even though, as before, for simplicity alone we continue to focus
on pure strategies only). We will use a very weak notion of iterative deletion of strictly
dominated strategies. More precisely, a message t′j for player j of type tj is said to be
ex-post strictly dominated by another message t′′j if, for any profile t−j that has positive







−j) (tj ,t−j),j (g(t′j, t′−j), t′j, t′−j). For each profile of types, we can compute
the set of ex-post strictly dominated messages for each player. Based on this notion,
iterative deletion of ex-post strictly dominated strategies can be defined in the usual
way.12 This is a coarse solution concept: for an arbitrary direct mechanism, many strate-
gies would survive this process of elimination. Hence, full implementation in iterative
deletion of ex-post dominated strategies is a demanding notion. Nevertheless, we have:
Theorem 2. Fix an incomplete information environment satisfying NEI and any SCF f : T ∗ →
A. Assume Bayesian separable punishment and fix i from that definition. Assume further that
each player j 6= i has a preference for honesty on T . Then the SCF f can be implemented in two
rounds of iterated deletion of ex-post strictly dominated strategies.
The proof is in the Appendix. To see how this result generalizes Theorem 1,13 recall
that in the complete-information case, the set of types for each player i is Θ and NEI
is satisfied. Note also that under the assumptions of Theorem 1, we could restrict the
problem to only two players i and j as defined in that theorem. In this smaller environ-
ment, NEI is still satisfied. Finally, as explained earlier, separable punishment implies
Bayesian separable punishment.
12This is reminiscent of the notion of implementation used by Bergemann and Morris (2008). However,
their notion does not require that the profile of types t−j have positive probability for player j of type tj ,
because agents do not have priors in their setting.




While the logic of our proofs rely on some players being indifferent over the outcomes
they can induce through their messages, our conclusions are not knife-edged. The rea-
son is that our results deliver implementation in rationalizable strategies (requiring
only two rounds of iterative deletion of dominated strategies). Given an incomplete
information game, Dekel et al. (2006) show that all rationalizable actions in any nearby
game derived by small perturbations to lower-order beliefs and arbitrary perturbations
to higher-order beliefs must in fact be rationalizable actions in the original complete-
information game.14 Although our setting differs from theirs because we consider lexi-
cographic preferences over the joint space of messages and outcomes, our results would
also continue to hold for a large class of perturbations of economically-natural environ-
ments satisfying separable punishment.15 To see this, consider in particular any setting
where the designer can augment (large) individual transfers to an underlying outcome
space and players have quasi-linear preferences over underlying outcomes and their
own transfer.16 In the mechanism used in the proof of Theorem 1, player j is outcome-
indifferent between all his messages because they only affect the transfer to the other
player, i, and hence has a strictly dominant strategy to report the truth owing to his
preference for honesty. Hence, virtually no matter how j’s preferences over underlying
outcomes are perturbed — so long as the transfer to i does not matter to j — truth-telling
would continue to be strictly dominant. The mechanism’s construction then implies that
i’s unique iteratively strictly dominant strategy would be to tell the truth even after any
perturbation to his preferences.
Consequently, our main results would continue to hold if, for example, agents have
slight uncertainty about either their own or others’ payoffs from outcomes, or about
whether others have a preference for honesty. Such robustness contrasts with many
implementation results that rely rather heavily on higher-order beliefs (see Oury and
14More precisely: the correspondence of interim-correlated rationalizable strategies is upper hemi-
continuous in the product topology in the universal type space.
15 In fact, given that the kth round of elimination of the rationalizability process only depends on the
kth first order beliefs (Dekel et al., 2007), it can be shown that our result would continue to hold so long
as the perturbation are small for only first and second order beliefs; they can be arbitrary for third and
higher order beliefs.
16The linearity is not important but is rather a convenient shorthand.
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Tercieux, 2012).
We conclude by noting that our results has some relevance for a debate on foun-
dations of incomplete contracting. Theories of incomplete contracts (e.g. the Property
Rights Theory of Grossman and Hart, 1986) that rely on information being observable
to the contracting parties but not verifiable to a third party (such as a court of law) suf-
fer from a “message game critique”. Maskin and Tirole (1999), for example, show how
one can effectively make information verifiable in the unique subgame-perfect equilib-
rium of a suitable mechanism following Moore and Repullo (1988), at least if renegotia-
tion can be eliminated and some other conditions are satisfied.17 This critique has been
called into question by Aghion et al. (2012) who show that the conclusion is not robust
to an arbitrarily small weakening of common knowledge between the contracting par-
ties.18 By contrast, Theorem 1 does not suffer this weakness because of the robustness
properties discussed above. In this sense, in contracting environments when separable
punishment is available, small preferences for honesty resuccitates the “message game
critique” of just using non-verifiable but observable information as a foundation for in-
complete contracts. We emphasize two caveats: first, while separable punishment holds
in some contracting environments of interest (e.g. Maskin and Tirole, 1999, Section 4),
the condition is not implied by joint punishments such as a no-trade outcome, for rea-
sons discussed immediately after Definition 2. Second, Aghion et al. (2012, Section 5)
point out in an example that introducing significant amount of asymmetric information
at the ex-post stage can provide a justification for the Property Rights Theory when play-
ers have standard preferences; it is easy to verify that their example would go through
even under small preferences for honesty. Our Theorem 2 reveals that a failure of non-
exclusive information would be key to any such justification; indeed, their example has
just two players.
17The issue of renegotiation is, of course, important but is itself debated in the literature from various
perspectives, such as whether it can be eliminated, how best to model it, and whether accounting for it
precludes ex-ante efficiency or not. For our purposes, it suffices to note that the message game critique,
if valid, forces one to find alternative foundations for incomplete contracts than mere non-verifiability,
whether the alternative is based on renegotiation or other reasons.
18Specifically, they show that an arbitrarily small perturbation that departs from common knowledge
eliminates the “truth-telling” equilibrium, and furthermore, any extensive-form mechanism admits an
undesirable sequential equilibrium in the perturbed game given a non-monotonic social choice function.
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Appendix: Proof of Theorem 2
Fix player i from the Theorem’s hypotheses. Consider the direct mechanism whose
outcome function is given by
g(t) =
f(t) if t ∈ T ∗x(t) otherwise. (5)
Fix any player j 6= i and any type tj of this player. Consider any profile of other types
for players other than j, t−j , such that (tj, t−j) ∈ T ∗, and fix an arbitrary message profile
for these players, t′−j .
Claim: For any t′j , g(tj, t′−j) ∼A(tj ,t−j),j g(t′j, t′−j).
Proof: The claim is trivially true if t′j = tj , so pick an arbitrary t′j 6= tj . Assume
first that (tj, t′−j) ∈ T ∗. Then, (5) implies g(tj, t′−j) = f(tj, t′−j). Further, (t′j, t′−j) /∈ T ∗
and g(t′j, t′−j) = x(t′j, t′−j), where the first equality is by NEI and the second by (5). Since
(tj, t
′
−j) ∈ T ∗, Bayesian separable punishment (Definition 5) now implies that g(t′j, t′−j) =
x(t′j, t
′
−j) ∼A(tj ,t−j),j f(tj, t′−j) = g(tj, t′−j), as claimed.
Next, assume (tj, t′−j) /∈ T ∗ and (t′j, t′−j) /∈ T ∗. Then, (5) yields g(tj, t′−j) = x(tj, t′−j)
and g(t′j, t′−j) = x(t′j, t′−j). By NEI, there is a unique type tˆj satisfying P (tˆj | t′−j) = 1,
and moreover (tˆj, t′−j) ∈ T ∗. Bayesian separable punishment then implies g(t′j, t′−j) =
x(t′j, t
′
−j) ∼A(tj ,t−j),j f(tˆj, t′−j) as well as g(tj, t′−j) = x(tj, t′−j) ∼A(tj ,t−j),j f(tˆj, t′−j). Hence, by
transitivity, g(tj, t′−j) ∼A(tj ,t−j),j g(t′j, t′−j), as desired.
Finally, it remains to consider (tj, t′−j) /∈ T ∗ and (t′j, t′−j) ∈ T ∗. Then, (5) yields
g(tj, t
′
−j) = x(tj, t
′
−j) and g(t′j, t′−j) = f(t′j, t′−j). By NEI and Bayesian separable punish-
ment, it follows that x(tj, t′−j) ∼A(tj ,t−j),j f(t′j, t′−j), and hence g(tj, t′−j) ∼A(tj ,t−j),j g(t′j, t′−j),
as desired. ‖
Since j has a preference for honesty on T , the Claim above implies the following for
all t−j for which (tj, t−j) ∈ T ∗:
∀t′−j and ∀t′j 6= tj : (g(t′−j, tj), t′−j, tj) (tj ,t−j),j (g(t′−j, t′j), t′−j, t′j).
In other words, it is ex-post strictly dominant for player j (who, recall was an arbitrary
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player different from i) to report the truth.
Now, consider player i of type ti and consider any profile t−i such that (ti, t−i) ∈ T ∗.
NEI and (5) imply that when all his opponents tell the truth, a truthful report from i
yields the outcome f(ti, t−i) while lying by reporting t′i 6= ti yields x(t′i, t−i) ≺A(ti,t−i),i
f(ti, t−i), where the strict preference inequality is by Bayesian separable punishment.
Hence, given that it is ex-post strictly dominant for all his opponents to report their types
truthfully, it is iteratively ex-post strictly dominant for player i to also report truthfully.
Q.E.D.
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